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GO VERNME.NT OF ISLAND TERRITORY.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS INCIDENT TO
THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT BY THE
UNITED STATES OF ISLAND TERRITORY.
ONE of the most important questions with which the Conven-
tion that framed the Constitution of the United States had
to deal was that as to the disposition and government of the
Western lands, with which the new nation was to be endowed.
The Congress of the Confederation had undertaken to determine
it for all time in 1784 and again in 1787, but by what authority?
Let us turn to the "Federalist" for an answer. Madison there an-
swers very plainly and very truly that they had none. After saying
that the cessions of territory then made and which might reasonably
be expected, would place a mine of vast wealth in the hands of the
new government, he proceeds thus: -
"We may calculate, therefore, that a rich and fertile country, of an
area equal to the inhabited extent of the United States, will soon become
a national stock. Congress having assumed the administration of this
stock, they have begun to render it productive. Congress have under-
taken to do more: they have proceeded to form new States; to erect
temporary governments; to appoint officers for them; and to prescribe
the conditions on which such States shall be admitted into the confed-
eracy. All this has been done; and done without the least color of con-
stitutional authority." 1
In the discussions of the constitutional convention there was a
decided difference of opinion as to the measure of local self-
government to which the settlers on this frontier ground ought to
be held entitled. Some favored the policy of the Confederation by
which certain fundamental principles were laid down as Articles
of compact between the old States and the new territory. Some
were for admitting no new States on a footing of equality with the
original thirteen. The men of Vermont and of "Franklin" were
a rough and turbulent set. There were many who thought they
needed to be held in check by a strong government.
The result was the adoption of a clause drafted with the diplo-
matic skill which was possessed in so rare a degree by Gouverneur
Morris. He meant it, he tells us in two striking letters to which
1 Federalist, No. 38.
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Mr. Justice Campbell called attention in the Dred Scott case, to
serve as a warrant to the new Congress to treat the Western terri-
tory and any other that we might acquire in the future as absolute
sovereigns. He contemplated as probable the ultimate inclusion
of the whole continent of North America in the limits of the
United States, and possibly that we might reach out still further,
though it was a possibility that he deplored. He meant, to quote
his words, that as to all territory outside the original States, we
should "govern them as provinces, and allow them no voice in our
councils. In wording the third section of the fourth article, I went
as far as circumstances would permit, to establish the exclusion.
Candor obliges me to add my belief, that had it been more point-
edly expressed, a strong opposition would have been made." '
This section, it is important to remember, is not put in that part
of the Constitution which is specially concerned with the legisla-
tive department, and in which most of the powers of Congress are
particularly specified.
Each of the three great departments is made the subject of a
separate article, and then comes the fourth where are gathered
together certain rules to govern the relations of the States to each
other, the character of their government, and the privileges of their
citizens. The third section of this article begins with regulations
as to the admission of new States into the Union, and then follows
the clause now especially under consideration, which is that "The
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United
States, or of any particular State." It is evident that this might
not unfairly be understood to refer to the public lands mainly in
their character as public property. The phrase "Territory or other
Property" certainly implies that "Territory" is to be considered
as property. Thus read, Congress would deal with it as represent-
ing the owner, rather than the sovereign. In one of its opinions
the Supreme Court of the United States seems to look at it from
this point of view. "The term Territory," it was remarked, "as
here used is merely descriptive of one kind of property; and is
equivalent to the word lands." 2
1 Scott v. Sandford, r9 Howard, 507
United States v. Gratiot, 14 Peters, 526, 527.
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A broader scope, however, had plainly been given it, in an earlier
case, while Chief Justice Marshall was on the bench. He was called
upon to decide, first, whether foreign territory could be acquired
by the United States, and then how, when acquired, it was to be
held and governed. These questions had, a quarter of a century
before, been hotly disputed in the political department of the
government: they were to be hotly disputed again, a quarter of a
century later, in the courts before his successors in office. He had
no difficulty in confirming, as incident to the executive power, what
his great adversary in national politics, who had recently passed
away, President Jefferson, had at first hesitated to claim as a right,
-the prerogative of acquiring new territory either by conquest or
cession from a foreign power.
The legislative department had not shared in Jefferson's doubts.
The Louisiana purchase was a political event of far greater import-
ance to the country than any of those which have marked the year
1898. It gave rise to animated discussion in both houses of Con-
gress, but it may fairly be said that neither of the great parties of
the day put in question the right of the President and Senate to
make the treaty, and so bring the vast territory which it embraced
under the sovereignty of the United States. The controverted
points were, first, the policy of the measure, and, second, the nature
of the relation created between the inhabitants whose allegiance
was transferred and the soil itself, on the one hand, and the United
States, on the other. It was claimed by some, in debate, to bring
them under the flag but not into the Union; to make the people
subjects rather than citizens, and the land on which they dwelt the
property of our government, but no part, properly speaking, of the
United States. We could hold it, they said, and control it, as a man
can hold and control a farm which he has bought, by right of pro-
prietorship, to be kept or sold, tilled or left fallow, at pleasure: it
was, in short, a proper field for a strictly colonial government. A
few asserted that the United States' could set up no laws anywhere
that were not founded on the consent of the governed.1
The question thus debated in the Fall of 18o3 was a practical
and pressing one. France had appointed, in June, a commissioner
to deliver possession, and was anxious to get the purchase money
into her treasury. The people who were the subject of the transfer
1 The debates are well summarized in Adams, Hist. of the United States, ii, zoo-
1"5.
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were uneasy and dissatisfied. Expedition was necessary. If in the
presence of such conditions all political parties were in agreement as
to the main doctrine to be applied, the precedent, as a record of
legislative construction on a point of constitutional law is of all the
more importance.
The Act of Congress of Oct. 31, 18o3, passed by large majorities
in each house, to meet the case, was a brief one. It gave the Presi-
dent carte blanche. He was authorized to take possession and occupy,
using such force as might be necessary to maintain the authority of
the United States, and calling out not exceeding 8o,ooo of the State
militia, if he thought proper. Then followed this plenary grant of
general authority:
"That, until the expiration of the present session of congress, unless
provision for the temporary government of the-said territories be sooner
made by congress, all the military, civil, and judicial powers exercised
by the officers of the existing government of the same shall be vested in
such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the
President of the United States shall direct, for maintaining and protect-
ing the inhabitants of Louisiana in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property and religion."
Jefferson immediately despatched commissioners to New Orleans
to receive the surrender of possession, and invested one of them,
Governor Claiborne, of the Territory of Mississippi, with all the
powers theretofore exercised over the Louisiana territory by the
Governor General and Intendant under the authority of Spain.
This made him a temporary king, and constituted the system of
government under which Louisiana remained until October of the
following year.
The Governor General, under the laws and usages of Spain, had
almost royal authority. He promulgated ordinances which had
the force of a statute. He appointed and removed at pleasure
commandants over each local subdivision of territory.1 He presided
over the highest court. The Intendant, however, was a counter-
poise. He was chief of the departments of Finance and Com-
merce. He acted as a Comptroller General, on whose warrant
only could payments be made from the treasury.
2 He was also
judge of the courts of admiralty and exchequer. Both these offices
Jefferson put in the hands of one man.
1 Public Documents, 8th Congress. An account of Louisiana, being an Abstract of
Documents in the Offices of the Department of State, and of the Treasury, Nov. 18o3,
39, 400 . Ibid., 33, 41.
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Judicial proceedings were' conducted in the forms of the civil
law. A son, whose father was living, could not sue without his
consent, nor persons belonging to a religious order, without that of
their superior.' He who reviled the Saviour or the Virgin Mary,
had his tongue cut out and his property confiscated.' A married
woman convicted of adultery and her paramour were to be de-
livered up to the will of the husband, with the reserve, however,
that if he killed one he must kill both.
3
All travellers, previous to circulating any news of importance,
were bound to relate it to the syndic of the district, who might for-
bid it to go farther if he thought such prohibition would be for the
public good.4
There was a religious establishment. Two canons and twenty-
five curates received salaries from the public treasury.5
A considerable code of laws, of which those to which I have
referred are not unfair examples, was thus left to be administered
or superseded and replaced by others, for an uncertain period, at the
will of one man, an agent of the executive power.
The Federalists in Congress, while willing, if not anxious, that
Louisiana should be governed as a colonial dependence, objected
to the passage of this Act, on the ground that it set up a despotism
incompatible with the Constitution. The answer of the leaders of
the party in power was that Congress had an authority in the terri-
tories which it had not in the States, and that the United States were
acting in the rightful capacity of sovereigns, precisely as Spain and
France had acted before them.'
In the case decided by Chief Justice Marshall twenty-five years
later, to which allusion has already been made, that of the Ameri-
can Insurance Company against Canter, the counsel for the de-
fendant, one of whom was Daniel Webster, claimed in argument
that the Constitution and laws of the United States did not extend
over Florida upon its cession by Spain. The usages of nations,
they said, had never conceded to the inhabitants of either con-
quered or ceded territory a right to participate in the privileges of
the Constitution of the country to which their allegiance had been
transferred. Congress might therefore govern them at its will.'
I An Account of Louisiana, &c., App. xxviii.
2 Ibid., xlv. Ibid., xlvi.
4 Ibid., Lxxi. 5 Ibid., 38.
6 Adams' Hist., ii, ixg. 7 z Peters, 533, 5 3 8.
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The Court, in its opinion, went with them to a certain point, but
no farther. Marshall declared that these inhabitants, though made
by the treaty of cession citizens of the United States, acquired no
right to share in political power; and also that the provision of
the Constitution that the judicial power of the United States
should be vested in courts of a certain description did not apply to
such courts as Congress had provided for Florida. His argument
on this, the turning-point of the case, was hardly worthy of so
great a judge. The Constitution, he said, required that the Judges
of the courts which it contemplated should hold office for good
behavior. The Act of Congress for the government of the Terri-
tory of Florida set up courts, the Judges of which were to hold
office only for four years. Therefore the Constitution did not
apply to them. What were they, then? Legislative courts, not
exercising any of the judicial power conferred by the people in the
grant made and defined in the third article of the Constitution, but
having a jurisdiction "conferred by Congress in the execution of
those general powers, which that body possesses over the terri-
tories of the United States." . . . "In legislating for them, Con-
gress exercises the combined powers of the general and of a State
government."
The other legislative powers granted by the people, so far at least
as the express terms of the Constitution are concerned, are either
limited in scope or else confined to some narrow field of operation.
The right to regulate the territories, so far as may be "needful,"
is given with no other definition of its bounds; and who but Con-
gress is to say how far that need extends? As to them, Congress
has, and it was meant by Morris that it should have,' every power
incident to an independent sovereignty, unless limitations are to be
read into the grant from its collocation, and by force of the funda-
mental principles on which the whole Constitution rests, or of certain
of its general prohibitions and guaranties.
The judicial powers granted to the courts of the United States
are carefully enumerated, and cover comparatively few of the ordi-
nary controversies that become the subject of litigation. Those
which Congress can put in the hands of its deputies for the terri-
tories extend over the whole domain of jurisprudence.
The executive power of the United States alone stands as to the
Territories on the same footing which it occupies as respects the
I Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard, 507.
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States. Congress may create territorial offices, but it cannot fill
them. Appointments must come from another source, and, so far
at least as the leading positions are concerned, are ineffectual until
commissions are signed by the President.' Probably also he has 
a
power of removal at will even of the judges.
2 Certainly he has a
far greater prerogative. Until Congress acts for the regulation 
of
any particular territory which the United States may acquire, the
President is under the constitutional duty to see that the authority
of the United States is recognized there and the peace of 
the
United States maintained. If the acquisition be by conquest, 
its
government falls to him from the first as the commander-in-chief
of the national forces. If it be by treaty, he must take possession,
and control it through such temporary agencies as he may think
proper, until Congress sees fit to 
act.3
Whether there are any provisions in the Constitution, or princi-
ples that underlie it, which operate as partial restrictions upon 
the
sovereign authority of Congress over the Territories, is a question
which has repeatedly been presented to the Supreme Court of 
the
United States, and to which its response has had a somewhat 
un-
certain sound. In 1850, in a case, turning upon the effect of 
a terri-
torial statute of Florida, the court spoke thus of territorial govern-
ments in general.
"They are legislative governments, and their courts legislative courts,
Congress, in the exercise of its powers in the organization and govern-
ment of the territories, combining the powers of both the Federal and
State authorities. There is but one system of government, or of 
laws
operating within their limits, as neither is subject to the constitutional
provisions in respect to State and Federal jurisdiction. They are 
not
organized under the Constitution, nor subject to its complex distribution
of the powers of government, as the organic law; but are the creations,
exclusively, of the legislative department, and subject to its supervision
and control. Whether or not there are provisions in that instrument which
extend to and act upon these territorial governments, it is not now material
to examine." 4
This opinion was delivered while political discussion was still
rife as to whether Congress could prohibit slavery in the Territories.
1 Constitution, Article II, Section 3.
2 McAllister v. United States, 14
X U. S. 174, 178; Parsons v. United States, 167
U. S. 324, 333.
2 Fleming v. Page, 9 Howard, 602; Cross v. Robinson, z6 Howard, 164, 193.
i Benner v. Porter, 9 Howard, 242.
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The Mexican war had stretched our boundaries to the Pacific. The
Wilmot proviso, in 1846, brought the question we are now con-
sidering into sharp and sudden prominence. General Cass had
been made the Democratic candidate for the Presidency in 1848,
in view and in no small part in consequence of an open letter to
his political friends, written the year before, in which he told them
that the right of Congress to regulate the territory and other prop-
erty of the United States would naturally be construed as merely
designed to embrace property regulations; that it had been pushed
farther in practice "by rather a violent implication;" but that it
was "a doubtful and invidious authority," and "should be limited
to the creation of proper governments for new countries, acquired
or settled, and to the necessary pro-vision for their eventual admis-
sion into the Union; leaving in the meantime to the people in-
habiting them to regulate their internal concerns in their own
way."
1
The .question was a troublesome one for politicians, as well as
for jurists. If the Missouri compromise of 1820 was to be upheld,
it must be because Congress could rightfully legislate as to the
domestic institutions of the Territories. If it was to be broken
through by the Wilmot proviso, it was also because Congress had
that power.
Some of the Whig leaders now took the ground that the power
to legislate fcr Territories in this and all other matters existed; but
was rather one resting on implication than upon express grant.
John Davis of Massachusetts defended this doctrine in the Senate,
but said that the exercise of the power was to be controlled by the
fundamental maxims of the Constitution. Calhoun came nearly to
the same position. The "needful rules and regulations clause,"
he said, "conferred no governmental power whatever." But the
Constitution recognized slavery. Slaves were therefore property,
so far as the United States were concerned. The citizens of the
United States were entitled to free access to every part of its un-
occupied territories. They must be allowed to take their property
with them. A sovereign State might abolish slavery within its
limits. Into that State a slaveholder could not thereafter take this
kind of property and hold it in possession. But the Constitution
shielded him in the Territories, for they took their political
I Letter of Dec. 24, 1847, to A. 0. P. Nicholson.
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character solely from the United States, and the Constitution was
their supreme law.
Davis's colleague was Daniel Webster. He met the issue, in the
line of his argument at the bar before Marshall, twenty years before,
by denying that the Constitution had any operation in the territories,
until Acts of Congress were made to enforce it: it was made for
the States, and not for territorial possessions. Benton took the
same ground, and maintained it in his "Thirty Years' View," pub-
lished in 1856.'
Calhoun had, at an earlier stage of the controversy, in 1848, in-
veighed in the Senate, in most impressive terms, against all meas-
ures looking to the acquisition of new territory to be governed as
a political dependency, and had introduced a resolution declaring
that to conquer and hold Mexico, "either as a province or to in-
corporate it in the Union would be a departure from the settled policy
of the government, in conflict with its character and genius, and in
the end subversive of our free and popular institutions."
While the political anvil was so hot, the Supreme Court wisely
confined itself to disposing of the cases before them, without pro-
nouncing upon academic questions, however important. Six years
later, however, it adopted a different policy. In the Dred Scott
case, Chief Justice Taney announced his adhesion and, so far as he
could, committed the court to the doctrine advocated by Calhoun.
The "needful rules and regulations clause," he declared, had no
operation on territory acquired since the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. Such territory was subject to such laws as Congress might
enact as the legislative arm of the government; but these must
be confined within the limits assigned by the Constitution for the
protection of person and property. A power to rule it without re-
striction, as a colony or dependent province, would be inconsistent
with the nature of our government. Slaves might therefore be
taken and held there, because slavery was a status recognized by
the Constitution.'
The court, as reconstituted during the civil war which the Dred
Scott decision had done so much to produce or to accelerate, re-
verted to the doctrine of Chief Justice Marshall, and in 1871 rein-
stated the "needful rules and regulations clause" as the primary
authority for our territorial legislation.' The right of a sovereign
' ii, 714. 2 Scott v. Sandford, z9 Howard, 447, e seq.
2 Clinton v. Engelbrecht, 13 Wallace, 434, 441, 447.
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to rule his possessions, in later decisions has also been relied on,
and has perhaps been most emphatically expressed in dealing with
the various Acts of Congress passed to suppress polygamy in Utah.
The fullest statement of the present view of the court was given by
Mr. Justice Matthews, in one of these Utah cases, in which after
saying that the question of the power of Congress to legislate for
the Territories as to matters of domestic concern is no longer open
for controversy, the opinion proceeded thus:-
"It has passed beyond the stage of controversy into final judgment.
The people of the United States, as sovereign owners of the National
Territories, have supreme power over them and their inhabitants. In the
exercise of this sovereign dominion, they are represented by the govern-
ment of the United States, to whom all the powers of government over
that subject have been delegated, subject only to such restrictions as are
expressed in the Constitution, or are necessarily implied in its terms, or
in the purposes and objects of the power itself; for it may well be ad-
mitted in respect to this, as to every power of society over its members,
that it is not absolute and unlimited. But in ordaining government for
the territories, and the people who inhabit them, all the discretion which
belongs to legislative power is vested in Congress; and that extends,
beyond all controversy, to determining by law, from time to time, the
form of the local government in a particular Territory, and the qualifica-
tion of those who shall administer it. It rests with Congress to say
whether, in a given case, any of the people resident in the Territory, shall
participate in the election of its officers or the making of its laws; and
it may, therefore, take from them any right of suffrage it may previously
have conferred, or at any time modify or abridge it, as it may deem ex-
pedient. The right of local self-government, as known to our system as
a constitutional franchise, belongs, under the Constitution, to the States
and to the people thereof, by whom that Constitution was ordained, and
to whom by its terms all power not conferred by it upon the government
of the United States was expressly reserved. The personal and civil
rights of the inhabitants of the Territories are secured to them, as to
other citizens, by the principles of constitutional liberty which restrain
all the agencies of government, State and National; their political rights
are franchises which they hold as privileges in the legislative discretion
of the Congress of the United States. This doctrine was fully and for-
cibly declared by the Chief Justice, delivering the opinion of the court in
National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U. S. 129. See also Amer-
ican Ins. Co. v. Canter, i Pet. 51; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet.
526; Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164; Dred Scott v. Sandford, i9 How.
393- If we concede that this discretion in Congress is limited by the
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obvious purposes for which it was conferred, and that those purposes are
satisfied by measures which prepare the people of the Territories to be-
come States in the Union, still the conclusion cannot be avoided, that
the Act of Congress here in question is clearly within that justification.
For certainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and neces-
sary in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth, fit to take
rank as one of the co-ordinate States of the Union, than that which seeks
to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and
springing from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy
estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble
in our civilization; the best guaranty of that reverent morality which is
the source of all beneficent progress in social and political improvement.
And to this end no means are more directly and immediately suitable than
those provided by this act, which endeavors to withdraw all political in-
fluence from those who are practically hostile to its attainment." I
It will be remarked that the Dred Scott opinion is here cited as
an authority. Mr. Justice Matthews' statement of the law was
quoted with approval in 1889, by Mr. Justice Bradley, in deciding
the greatest of all the Utah cases- that which held that Congress,
as representing the parens patric of the territory, could annul the
charter of the Mormon Church, confiscate its property, and devote
it to public uses. He added, however, this important observation of
his own: -
"Doubtless Congress, in legislating for the Territories would be subject
to those fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are
formulated in the Constitution and its amendments; but these limitations
would exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution,
from which Congress derives all its powers, than by any express and direct
application of its provisions." 2
It will be perceived that these few but pregnant words, repeated
later with approval in an Alaska case by Mr. Justice Harlan,3 sub-
stantially reaffirm a position on which the Dred Scott decision was
rested by all the justices but three, and from which none of the
other three dissented.4  This is that Congress, in making rules
for the Territories, is subject to some or all of the restrictions and
prohibitions imposed upon it by the Constitution as respects other
legislation affecting person or property. A difference is indeed
1 Murphy v. Ramsey, Z14 U. S. 44, 45.
2 Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. i, 42, 44, 58, 67.
3 McAllister v. United States, X41 U. S. 17 ", 188
4 Scott v. Sandford, i9 Howard, 542, 614.
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made in the mode of statement. In 1850, the court considered
the letter as well as the spirit of the Constitution to have a con-
trolling force. In 1884 what is to be implied or derived from its
spirit is treated as the main if not the only source of restraint.
This mode of expression may have been adopted in order to leave
the way open to hold, should occasion arise, that the United States
could not lawfully acquire territory to hold permanently or for an
indefinite period as a dependent province or colony. If, however,
it means what it seems to declare, and is of general application,
then the utterance of Taney on this point seems intrinsically en-
titled to the most respect. That is in line with what Chief Justice
Marshall said in the great case of Cohens against Virginia,' in dis-
cussing the not dissimilar power of Congress to legislate for the
District of Columbia, and meeting the objection that such legis-
lation had simply a local effect. "Congress," he observed, "is not
a local legislature, but exercises this particular power, like all its
other powers, in its high character as the legislature of the Union.
The American people thought it a necessary power, and they con-
ferred it for their own benefit. Being so conferred, it carries with
it all those incidental powers which are necessary to its complete
and effectual execution. Whether any particular law be designed
to operate without the district or not, depends on the words of that
law. If it be designed so to operate, then the question, whether
the power so exercised be incidental to the power of exclusive legis-
lation, and be warranted by the Constitution, requires a considera-
tion of that instrument. In such cases the Constitution and the
law must be compared and construed."
Any other construction leaves the rights of the citizen too much
at the will of the judiciary, and ignores the natural meaning of our
bill of rights.' The main privileges and immunities guaranteed by
the amendments to the Constitution, which serve that office, are
shared by every foreigner who may be found within our jurisdic-
tion.3 They must then certainly be the heritage of every settled
inhabitant of the land. Such is their force in every organized
Territory by Act of Congress (Revised Statutes, Section 189i )
and I believe it to be the same in every unorganized territory
1 6 Wheaton, 264.
2 See .Pomeroy, Constitutional Law, § 498; Cooley, Principles of Constitutional
Law, 36.
3 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238, 239, 242.
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which is subjected to civil government, by virtue of the Con-
stitution itself.'
If the laws of Congress as to the Territories are laws of the
United States and subject in all respects to the Constitution of
the United States, how can we justify the long established practice
of investing the Territorial legislatures with general legislative
power? Here, again, we may turn to Chief Justice Marshall for
an answer. The "needful rules and regulations clause," he said
in McCulloch against Maryland,
2 authorizes the organization of a
territorial government which constitutes a corporate body. Pre-
cisely as a State may incorporate a city, with its city council, the
United States may incorporate a Territory with a territorial council
or a legislature. The statutes of such a body will not be laws of
the United States, but laws of that part of it lying within the cor-
porate limits, so far as Congress may have left the field open for
their adoption. They are like the laws of our chartered colonies
before the Revolution.
Assuming, then, that the Constitution is the supreme law wher-
ever the flag of the Union floats over its soil, are there any of its
provisions which are likely to embarrass us in dealing with our new
possessions ?
That they are islands and not part of the mainland of North
America is, of itself, an immaterial circumstance, so far as the
right to acquire them is concerned. Islands that fringe a conti-
nent are part of it. Puerto Rico and Cuba are American islands.
3
Hawaii is in a position to command our coast, and lies nearer to
us than the outer Aleutian Island, the acquisition of which has
been oonfirmed by general acqaiescence during thirty years. For
temporary commercial purposes, indeed, we have the warrant of
the Supreme Court for saying that the President, with the author-
ity of Congress, can acquire any island, however remote, and make
it, while retained, a part of the United States.' If there is any
difficulty in our accepting the cession of the Philippines, it is not
that they are islands, but that they are not appurtenant to the
American continent.
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 154, 162; Thompson v. Utah, 170
U. S. 343, 346; In re Sah Quah, 31 Fed. Rep. 329, 330.
2 4 Wheaton, 316.
' See a discussion of the Historic Policy of the United States as to Annexation in
the Report of the American Historical Association for 1893, page 379.
4 Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 212, 221.
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Are we then - should the Spanish treaty be ratified - to meet
any constitutional difficulty in holding and governing whatever it
may bring us?
The XIV. and XV. Amendments must certainly prove a source
of embarrassment. The latter declares that the right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States on account of race or color. By Section
1992 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, "all persons
born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the
United States." This statute was passed, on April 9, i866, by
the same Congress which framed and on June i6, i866, proposed
to the States for ratification the XIV. Amendment, with which,
therefore, it may fairly be assumed to have been intended to be in
harmony. The first words of that Amendment are that "all per-
sons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States, and of the
State wherein they reside." If this stood alone and unexplained
by contemporary legislation, it might be argued that it applied
only to persons residing in one of the States. But read in the
light of Revised Statutes, Section 1992, it would seem a more
natural construction to treat it as adding to that the farther step
to which the consent of the States was necessary, that those thus
born or naturalized, if they then or afterwards resided in a State,
should be citizens of that State, as well as of the United States. It
will be observed that the State among whose citizens they are thrust
is not necessarily that of their birth. It is any State in which citizens
of the United States may at any time reside.
Whether therefore Revised Statutes, Section 1992, should be
repealed or not, the XIV. Amendment would seem to make every
child, of whatever race, born in any of our new territorial posses-
sions after they become part of the United States, of parents who
are among its inhabitants and subject to our jurisdiction, a citizen
of the United States from the moment of birth. The Indian tribes
on our own continent are held not to be subject to our jurisdiction
in the sense in which those words are here employed. They were
until 1871 (Revised Statutes, Section 2079) considered as separate
nations with which we dealt as treaty powers.' Their present condi-
tion has been described by the Supreme Court of the United States
The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters, x.
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as "a dependent condition, a state of pupilage, resembling that oLa
ward to his guardian." 1 Can this same position be assigned to the
Malays, the Moros, and the many savage tribes in the Philippines?
This will bea grave question for Congress and the 
courts to meet.
2
But, however that may be decided, the people of Puerto Rico and
the natives of Hawaii will certainly be fully subject to our jurisdic-
tion. Their children, born after the ratification of the Spanish
treaty, if it should be ratified, will all be citizens of the United
States. They must, therefore, by the XV. Amendment have the
same right of suffrage which may be conceded in those territories
to white men of civilized races. One generation of men is soon re-
placed by another, and in the tropics more rapidly than with us. In
fifty years, the bulk of the adult population of Puerto Rico, Hawaii,
and the Philippines, should these then form part of the United States,
will be claiming the benefit of the XV. Amendment.
The provision in the first Article of the Constitution that "all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States" will also prove an awkward obstacle to any policy
of the "open door," if our protective system is to be maintained.
It requires that any customs duties we may impose on imported
goods shall be of one and the same form and at one and the same
rate at every port of entry throughout the United States.' If
there is a duty of forty per cent collectible on woollen cloth brought
to New York from a foreign port, the same percentage must be
collected on woollen cloth brought to Manila from a foreign port,
subject only to any temporary reservations of a right to entry
on more favorable terms which may be made in the treaty of
cession.
On this point the Supreme Court of the United States had occa-
sion to speak soon after the Mexican war, when California became
ours by the treaty of peace, and a contest arose over the right of the
temporary government set up by the United States to exact duties
on imported goods landed at San Francisco.
"By the ratifications of ti e treaty," says the opinion, "Cali-
fornia became a part of the United States. And as there is
nothing differently stipulated in the treaty with respect to com-
merce, it became instantly bound and privileged by the laws which
1 Elk v. Wilkins, ix2 U. S. 94, 99.
2 See United States v. Kagama, 1x8 U. S. 375, 380, 384.
3 Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 594.
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Congress had passed to raise a revenue from duties on imports and
tonnage."
1
It was contended by the importers that as Congress had not yet
made San Francisco a port of entry or constituted any collection
district in California the tariff law could not apply. To this the
court replied as follows:
"Can any reason be given for the exemption of foreign goods from
duty because they have not been entered and collected at a port of delivery?
The last became a part of the consumption of the country, as well as the
others. They may be carried from the point of landing into collection
districts within which duties have been paid upon the same kinds of
goods; thus entering, by the retail sale of them, into competition with
such goods, and with our own manufactures, and the products of our own
farmers and planters. The right claimed to land foreign goods within
the United States at any place out of a collection district, if allowed,
would be a violation of that provision in the Constitution which enjoins
that all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the
United States. Indeed, it must be very clear that no such right exists,
and that there was nothing in the condition of California to exempt
importers of foreign goods into it from the payment of the same duties
which were chargeable in the other ports of the United States. As to
the denial of the authority of the President to prevent the landing of
foreign goods in the United States out of a collection district, it can
only be necessary to say, if he did not do so, it would be a neglect of
his constitutional obligation 'to take care that the laws be carefully
executed.' " 2
Many other difficulties of a constitutional 'character must be en-
countered, and more than can be noticed in the limits appropriate
for an article like this. I will note two which address themselves
particularly to the consideration of the political departments of
our government.
i. The XIV. Amendment declares that should any State abridge
or deny the right of suffrage as to any of its adult male inhabitants
who are citizens of the United States, except for crime, its repre-
sentation in Congress shall be correspondingly reduced.
This applies in terms only to the States; but does it not state
a constitutional principle- that of manhood suffrage for every
citizen-which the spirit of this Amendment requires us to
observe in dealing with our Territories? Such would seem to
have been its legislative construction in the Title of the Revised
Cross v. Harrison, i6 Howard, 197. 2 Cross v. Harrison, i6 Howard. 198.
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Statutes relating to that subject (Sections 1859, i86o). Can we
properly leave the restriction upon the States, and relieve Hawaii
from its operation?
It is true that it has never been enforced against the States, but
it may be, at the pleasure of Congress, at any time.
2. An objection against the permanent incorporation of the Philip-
pines into the United States remains for consideration which, if
sound, is insurmountable.
This nation is the United States of America. That name was
assumed on July 4, 1776, by the "Representatives of the United
States of America in General Congress assembled," who signed
the Declaration of Independence. The first Article of our first
Constitution, the Articles of Confederation, is that "The Stile of
this Confederacy shall be 'The United States of America."' The
preamble of our present Constitution states its adoption by "the
People of the United States in order to form a more perfect Union
• * and secure the Blessings of Liberty" to themselves and their
"Posterity." What they did was summarized at the close of the
preamble. It was to "ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America."
The United States of America is a plural term. The union of
separate States in one political body does not extinguish their
separate existence, nor vary the force of their having formed this
"more perfect union" in order to promote their several as well as
their common interests. Can the United States of America ever
include a State erected on islands off the coast of Asia, and having
no possible tie of connection with the American continent? I be-
lieve that to this a negative answer may be safely given. Can they,
then, annex such islands to a union into which they can never enter
on equal terms?
This question cuts deeper than the one propounded to the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Dred Scott case. The
opinion given there was that we could not acquire any American
territory to hold permanently as a dependent province. If that
position be unsound, it would not follow that islands appertaining
to another continent could be so acquired and held.
To acquife, of course, is one thing, and to keep, another.
I believe we have unquestionable power to acquire the Philip-
pines as the spoils of war; but a conqueror is not bound and may
not be able to retain what he receives.
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If we should be unable or unwilling to hold them permanently
as a colonial dependence, how could we get rid of such possessions?
It would seem logical to hold that the treaty-making branch of
the government, by which they were acquired, could by similar
proceedings convey them to some other power. So far as a transfer
of sovereignty is concerned it could not be accomplished otherwise,
unless successful revolt or other political change had made the Fil-
ipinos an independent people. To make a grant, there must be
some one with whom to close the contract.
But it is the right of Congress to dispose of the territory of the
United States, considered in the character of property. To sell or
give away any part of the national domain reduces by so much the
national resources. As all measures to raise revenue must originate
in the House of Representatives, and to stop the revenues from any
territory by its alienation would require raising more revenue by
taxation, it would seem proper, if not necessary, that the whole of
Congress and not merely the President and Seuate should concur
in any measure that reduced the area of the republic.
Could such a reduction be made either through Congress by law
or the President and Senate by treaty, or both together, if it took
the shape of a gift to the Filipinos, under which our ownership and
sovereignty would pass to them as an independent power? No
authority for such a transaction is expressly given in the Consti-
tution. If implied, it would probably have to rest on the assump-
tion that the Philippines had proved a damnosa hereditas. There
would be greater difficulty in defending it on the ground that we
had taken them as an act of humanity to spread the blessings of
independent liberty over an oppressed people, after we had elevated
and educated them sufficiently to make them fit to use it aright.
For foreign missionary work of this kind in another continent, our
Constitution contains no provision.
The case of Cuba is, of course, far different. That lies at our
doors. It has not been ceded to the United States. Spain has re-
linquished her sovereignty, but she has not transferred it to us. Our
position is to be that of a custodian, or receiver. The sovereignty
is, in effect, in abeyance, but it is to pass, by our pledged consent,
to the Cuban people, whenever they organize a government for
themselves, and show that they can maintain it, and with it the peace
and order to which Cuba has been so long a stranger.
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Let me briefly summarize the conclusions which, it would seem to
me, we must accept.
There is no constitutional objection to the acquisition of any or
all of our new possessions, or to subjecting them to a temporary
government of military or colonial form.
There is no constitutional objection to our taking temporary
possession of Cuba, as a friend of the Cubans, and maintaining
peace and order by a military occupation, under the President of
the United States, until such time as we may deem its people fit
to govern themselves. It is a practical application of the Monroe
Doctrine in its modern form.
Until Congress acts, the President can govern our new posses-
sions with no other authority than that with which his great office
is clothed by the Constitution in its grant of executive power.'
If the Spanish treaty should be ratified, Congress could replace
the temporary government which the President has set up in
Puerto Rico by whatever form of administration it may think
proper, not inconsistent with the principles and provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, and maintain it until the inhab-
itants may be fit to govern themselves. No fixed limit of time
can be assigned for the duration of such a regime. We have held
Alaska under such conditions already for thirty years, and she is
hardly more deserving of autonomy now than when she was a
Russian province. We have held New Mexico, under different
forms of administration, for nearly fifty years, and the character
and traditions and laws of a Latin race are still so deeply stamped
upon her people and her institutions that no demand of party
exigency has been strong enough to secure her admission to the
privilege of statehood. Here, as in so many other matters where
constitutional law and legislative policy may come in conflict, every
presumption is to be made in favor of the good faith of Congress and
the wise exercise of its discretion.
Upon the ratification of the treaty, Puerto Rico would become
(and for the first time become) a part of the United States, but
our customs laws would not have full operation there until Con-
gress created the necessary collection districts and ports of entry.
2
Until then, the temporary government of the President would con-
' Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 Howard, 176, 178.
2 Fleming v. Page, 9 Howard, 602, 616, 617; Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wallace, 73,
88, 97-
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tinue; duties on imports could be lawfully collected by his agents;
and whatever courts of a municipal character he may have set up
would continue in the discharge of their functions, with the power
of life and death.'
And here such certainty as can be derived from judicial prece-
dent or settled legislative construction and popular acquiescence
comes to an end.
Whether Puerto Rico can be held permanently and avowedly as
a colonial dependence; whether the Philippines could be held per-
manently, whether with or without a view of ultimately dividing
them into States to be admitted as such into the Union; whether
they could be given over to their inhabitants; whether all trials
for crimes committed there must be by jury; whether Cuba, which
we have taken in the capacity of a friend or protector, for the bene-
fit of its people, through a war, at the outset of which the public
faith was pledged not to acquire it for ourselves by right of con-
quest, could, should we come at last to despair of their capacity
for self-government, be kept as part of the territory of the United
States; whether in this republic there can be settled inhabitants
of civilized or semi-civilized races owing allegiance to the United
States alone, but who can be regarded as subjects and not citizens,
2
-these are questions unsettled so far as we can consult the oracles
of the past, and in view of which the Senate must act, in dealing
with the great issue now presented to it as the executive council
with which the States have surrounded the President to protect
their interests against an undue exercise of executive power.
The last in the list, however, and not the least in importance,
while never adjudicated upon by the Supreme Court of the United
States, received an answer from one of its most illustrious Judges,
by way of an obiter dictum, in the first great case in which the
construction of the Constitution was involved. This was Chis-
holm v. Georgia, in which the matter in issue was as to how far
the ordinary immunity from suit belonging to a sovereign had been
stripped from the States by the grant of judicial power to the
United States. Mr. Justice Wilson in his opinion, when discuss-
ing what sovereignty is, had occasion to consider what is subject to
it and used these words:
I Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 Howard, 498, 515; The Grapeshot, 9 Wallace, 129, 133-
2 See on this point Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, 362, 169; In re Look Ting Sing,
io Sawyer, 353; 21 Fed. Rep. 9o5.
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"In one sense, the term sovereign has for its correlative, subjec. 
In
this sense, the term can receive no application; for it has no object 
in
the Constitution of the United States. Under that Constitution 
there
are citizens, but no subjects. 'Citizen of the United States.' 'Citizens 
of
another State.' 'Citizens of different States.' 'A State or citizen 
thereof.'
The term subject occurs, indeed, once in the instrument; but to mark 
the
contrast strongly, the epithet 'foreign' is prefixed." 1
In respect to the mode of trial for crimes committed in Puerto
Rico and the Philippines, should they be annexed and civil govern-
ment established there by Act of Congress, I think it probable
though not certain that a jury would be indispensable. Article
IV, Section 2, declares expressly that "the Trial of all 
Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury," and this 
was
dearly intended to embrace those committed outside of any 
State.
But this provision is contained in a section dealing exclusively
with the subjects of judicial power particularly granted. 
It is
settled (whether logically or illogically) that the courts of Terri-
tories do not exercise the power thus conferred. Congress finds 
its
warrant for them in quite different parts of the Constitution, 
and
it is a sufficient warrant for investing them with jurisdiction 
over
every kind of act against the peace of the United States which the
laws of the United States may forbid. True, jurisdiction of similar
extent may be and has been given under this particular section 
to
the regular courts of the United States; but the source of power
under which the different tribunals act is different. The source 
of
power for the ordinary courts gives it with a limitation in favor 
of
trial by jury. The source of power for territorial courts might, 
I
think, be read as giving it with no such limitation. While this 
would
give rather a strict construction to the constitutional guaranty, 
it
would be quite in line with that which the Supreme Court 
has as-
signed to other provisions hardly less important, such as that secur-
ing the tenure of judicial office during good behavior.
The court, however, made a decision a few years since, which
tends strongly in the opposite direction. A man was convicted 
of
a misdemeanor, in the police court of the District of Columbia,
upon a trial before the Judge, after a demand for a jury 
had been
refused. He sought relief, by a writ of habeas corpus, from 
con-
finement under the sentence. The Act of Congress, passed 
under
its authority "to exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases 
what-
L 2 Dallas, 419, 456.
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soever" over the District, which constituted the police court,
denied a jury in such proceedings. The Supreme Court of the
District had sustained the validity of this statute, and refused to
release the prisoner. This judgment was reversed by the Supreme
Court of the United States on the sole ground that he had a consti-
tutional right to a jury trial, and their reasons were thus stated:
"There is nothing in the history of the Constitution or of the original
amendments to justify the assertion that the people of this District may
be lawfully deprived of the benefit of any one of the constitutional guar-
antees of life, liberty, and property - especially of the privilege of trial
by jury in criminal cases. In the Draft of a Constitution reported by the
Committee of Five on the 6th of August, 1787, in the convention which
framed the Constitution, the 4th section of article XI read that 'the trial
of all criminal offences (except in cases of impeachment) shall be in the
States where they shall be committed; and shall be by jury.' i Elliott's
Deb., 2d ed., 229. But that article was, by unanimous vote, amended so
as to read: 'The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachment)
shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said
crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any
State, then the trial shall be at such place or places as the legislature may
direct.' Id. 270. The object of thus amending the section, Mir. Madi-
son says, was to 'provide for trial by jury of offences committed out of
any State.' 3 Madison papers, 144. In Reynolds v. United States, 98
U. S. 145, 154, it was taken for granted that the Sixth Amendment of
the Constitution secured to the people of the Territories the right of
trial by jury in criminal prosecutions; and it had been previously held in
Webster v. Reid, ii How. 437, 460, that the Seventh Amendment secured
to them a like right in civil actions at common law. We cannot think
that the people of this District have, in that regard, less rights than those
accorded to the people of the Territories of the United States." 1
If the views thus expressed are not overruled (and they were re-
affirmed with equal positiveness during the last year 2), they must
lead to the conclusion that no conviction for crime could be had in
any of our new possessions, after the establishment there of an
orderly civil government, except upon a jury trfal.
I think also that by the ordinary rules of construction, the
provisions of the third, fifth, and eighth Amendments must be
regarded in any form of territorial government which Congress may
construct for any part of the United States; including, of course,
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 550.
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 346.
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Puerto Rico and the Philippines, should the pending treaty be
ratified, and if, as I have taken for granted, it cedes to us the
sovereignty over both.
If no[, it must be on the theory that the guaranties which they
afford to personal liberty refer only to proceedings had in the
exercise of the judicial power of the United States. To read them
thus would seem to me to violate the ordinary rule that constitu-
tional provisions for the safety of the individual and the security of
property should be favorably and liberally construed.' It would
also lead to what I should say was the inadmissible assumption
that the Amendments set up no checks against executive and
legislative power.' The fourth amendment, which guards the
people against unreasonable arrests and general warrants, was
successfully invoked in an early case before Chief justice Marshall,
arising in the Territory of Orleans. General Wilkinson, who was
then in command of the army of the United States, and superin-
tending the fortifications at New Orleans, arrested two men impli-
cated in the Burr conspiracy, and sent them on to Washington for
trial. There was a Territorial court at New Orleans before which
they might have been prosecuted. Arrived at Washington, they
applied for a writ of habeas corpus, and were discharged by order
of the Supreme Court of the United States, mainly on the ground
that they could only be prosecuted where their offence was com-
mitted, and so that their arrest was unwarranted by the Constitu-
tion.3 judge Story, in commenting on the decision, remarks that
as the arrests were made without any warrant from a civil magis-
trate, they were in violation of the third amendment.
4
Our Constitution was made by a civilized and educated people.
It provides guaranties of personal security which seem ill adapted
to the conditions of society that prevail in many parts of our new
possessions. To give the half-civilized Moros of the Philippines,
or the ignorant and lawless brigands that infest Puerto Rico, or
even the ordinary Filipino of Manila, the benefit of such immuni-
ties from the sharp and sudden justice- or injustice- which they
have been hitherto accustomed to expect, would, of course, be a
serious obstacle to the maintenance there of an efficient government.
I Boyd v. United States, 1i6 U. S. 616.
2 State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 309.
3 Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75.
, Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, § x895, note.
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Every people under a written Constitution must experience diffi-
culties of administration that are unknown to nations like Great
Britain, which are unfettered by legal restraints imposed by former
generations. It is part of the price it pays for liberty, that new con-
ditions must be dealt with, in fundamentals, under old laws.
The people of the United States, when they framed this Consti-
tution for themselves and their posterity, had they contemplated a
day when the Executive might negotiate a treaty of cession embrac-
ing an archipelago in the waters of Asia, might have relaxed some
of the restrictions which they were laying down to limit the legisla-
tive power. They might also have strengthened and multiplied
them. They may now be asked to declare their will, through the
slow process of constitutional amendment; but until they speak,
we must take the Constitution as it is.
Simeon E. Baldwin.
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